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CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS 
Defences on Cheque Certification: 
ltssesv.F'riedberg 
Benjamin Geva * 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Esses v. Friedberg & Co. 1 was an appeal primarily on a summary 
judgment given in favour of plaintiff suing a certifying bank on three 
cheques. Plaintiff Esses was the payee who, as their holder, had them 
presented for payment to the Bank of Montreal (BMO), the drawee/ 
certifying bank, which dishonoured them. In reversing the summary 
judgment against the certifying bank, the Court of Appeal recognized 
the liability of a bank certifying a cheque as that of an acceptor of a bill;2 
nevertheless, the Court of Appeal declined to see this as conclusive to 
the result of the case. In the view of Watt J.A., where the issue of the 
cheques was affected with fraud, a plaintiff seeking to enforce liability 
thereon must not have participated in the fraudulent scheme, and must 
have acquired the cheques without knowledge of it. Furthermore, to 
succeed, it is up for the plaintiff to prove that these requirements have 
been met.3 
In effect, in line with what I have advocated,4 the Court recognized 
the distinction between a binding obligation on a negotiable instrument 
and its autonomy. The Court thus did not adopt the strict "cash equiva-
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School York University, Toronto, Canada. 
1 2008 Carswel!Ont 5526, 2008 ONCA 646 (Ont. C.A.). 
2 The Court specifically cited, ibid., at para. 48, Maubach v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1988), 
1987 CarswellOnt 1072, 62 O.R. (2d) 220, 44 D.L.R. (4th) 575, 25 O.A.C. 211 (Ont. C.A.), 
at 221 [O.R.]; andA.E. Le Page Real Estate Services Ltd. v. Rattray Publications Ltd. (1994), 
1994 CarswellOnt 1206, [1994] OJ. No. 2950, 77 O.A.C. 280, 120 D.L.R. (4th) 499, 21 
O.R. (3d) 164 (Ont. C.A.) at paras. 16-17 [Lepage]. Both cases cited with agreement my 
own article cited in note 6 below. Under s. 127 of the Bills of Exchange Act, R.S.C., 1985, 
c. B-4 [BEA], "The acceptor of a bill by accepting it engages that he will pay it according 
to the tenor of his acceptance." Under BEA, s. 165, "A cheque is a bill drawn on a bank, 
payable on demand" and in principle, "the provisions of this Act applicable to a bill payable 
on demand apply to a cheque." For"bill" and "bill of exchange", see BEA, s. 2 ands. 16(1). 
3 Esses v. Friedberg, supra, n. 1, particularly at para. 69. 
4 B. Geva, "The Autonomy of the Banker's Obligation on Bank Drafts and Certified Cheques" 
(1994) 73 Can. Bar Rev. 21, and addendum, at 280. 
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]ency" explanation to certification, and rejected the existence of an 
absolute obligation by a certifying bank, not linked to the merits of the 
plaintiffs position.5 Furthermore, again, in line with the position I al-
ready expressed, 6 the judgment demonstrates that by no means the ac-
ceptance theory for certification necessarily requires the existence of an 
absolute liability of the certifying bank to any holder, regardless of 
whether such a holder is a holder in due course;7 rather the latter must 
have acquired the cheques in good faith and for value,8 and so as to be 
able to hold the instrument free from adverse c1aims and contract de-
fences. 9 
For all these reasons Esses v. Friedberg is welcome. Nevertheless, 
in reaching the correct result, the Court of Appeal glossed over a few 
fundamentals underlying the law of bills and notes. The purpose of this 
case comment is to examine carefully the decision under the law appli-
cable to negotiable instruments. 
2. FACTS 
The pertinent facts of Esses v. Friedberg are as follows. Friedberg, 
a local currency exchange and brokerage, received from a money dealer 
a $450,000 CAD bank draft drawn by the Canadian Imperial Bank of 
Commerce (CIBC) and payable to Friedberg. In return, and as instructed 
by the money dealer, Friedberg drew on its USD account with BMO 
three cheques payable to the plaintiff and delivered them to the money 
5 As appeared to be the law under LePage, supra, n. 2. 
6 B. Geva, "Irrevocability of Bank Drafts, Certified Cheques and Money Orders" (1987) 65 
Can. Bar Rev. 107 at 123-130, particularly 126-130 (acceptance theory for liability on 
certification). 
7 A point acknowledged by B. Crawford, Payment, Clearing and Settlement in Canada, vol. 
2 (J\urora: Canada Law Book, 2002) at 1227 (§31 :07.5(e), notwithstanding his critique of 
the acceptance explanation for certification (Ibid., at 1217-1252 (§31 :07), particularly at 
1226- 1233§31 :07.05(e)). 
8 Per BEA, s. 55( I): 
A holder in due course is a holder who has taken a bill, complete and regular on the 
face of it, under the following conditions, namely, (a) that he became the holder of it 
before it was overdue and without notice that it had been previously dishonoured, if 
such was the fact; and (b) that he took the bill in good faith and for value, and that at 
the time the bill was negotiated to him he had no notice of any defect in the title of the 
person who negotiated it. 
9 Per BEA, s. 73(b ), a holder in due course "holds the bill free from any defect of title of prior 
parties, as well as from mere personal defences available to prior parties among themselves, 
and may enforce payment against all parties liable on the bill." 
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dealer. 10 The money dealer had the three Friedberg cheques certified by 
BMO; he then allegedly delivered them to plaintiff in exchange for 
$450,000 CAD in cash (and a commission). 11 More than four months 
later, plaintiff delivered the three Friedberg cheques to Bank Leumi 
branch in Toronto for deposit in his account with Bank Leumi Luxem-
bourg.12 Bank Leumi Luxembourg provisionally credited plaintiffs ac-
count with the amount of the deposit. However, on the instructions of 
BMO alleging that the funds had been derived from fraud, Bank Leumi 
Luxembourg subsequently reversed the credit to plaintiffs account. 
Claiming the status of a holder in due course on the Friedberg cheques 
plaintiff sued BMO on its certification of the three Friedberg cheques. 
The CIBC bank draft payable to Friedberg, against which the three 
Friedberg cheques were issued, had been purchased from CIBC by a 
fraudster. The fraudster, the remitter of the CIBC bank draft, bought it 
with proceeds received by him in a fraudulent real estate transaction, 
under which he had "sold" a residential property that did not belong to 
him to a sham buyer who paid with proceeds of a land-mortgage loan 
fraudulently procured from BMO. Those proceeds had been deposited 
in a bank account with CIBC from which the fraudster withdrew the 
funds with which he paid for the bank draft. The fraudster thus allegedly 
received the value of the CIBC bank draft in cash from the plaintiff in a 
transaction brokered by the money dealer. 
3. JUDGMENT 
BMO argued that the plaintiff was well aware of and complicit in 
the fraudulent scheme. BMO further questioned whether plaintiff even 
gave the cash for the three Friedberg certified cheques. On his part, 
plaintiff denied knowledge of and participation in the fraudulent scheme. 
Thus, in the view of the Court, "The central issues in this case have to 
.. do with [plaintiff's] knowledge of the provenance of the scheme by 
which the certified cheques came into his possession and whether [he], 
in fact, gave value for the cheques. " 13 Watt J .A. thus rejected the position 
10 Two cheques were for $115,000 USD, and the third was for $112, 980 USD. See Esses v. 
Friedberg, supra, n. I at para. 18. 
11 In fact no receipt was issued for the funds, receipt of which was contested by the defendant. 
See supra, n. I at paras. 21 and 73. 
12 Ibid., at paras. 22 and 31. 
" Ibid., at para. 73. 
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of the motion judge who "grounded [plaintiff's] entitlement on the basis 
that he was the payee of the cheques that BMO certified [and therefore] 
could not refuse to honour ... ", regardless of whether the plaintiff was 
a holder in due course; 14 in her view, to successfully raise a triable issue, 
BMO must have proved plaintiffs participation in the fraud. 15 
In rejecting altogether her analysis, Watt J.A. stated as follows: 
The payee of a cheque is a holder under s. 2 of the BEA. Under s. 57(2) of the 
Act, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, every holder of a bill of exchange, 
including the payees of certified cheques, is deemed to be a holder in due course. 
The presumption is rebuttable by evidence to the contrary. But if acceptance, 
issue or subsequent negotiation of the bill is affected with fraud or illegality, the 
burden of proof that a person is the holder in due course is on the party who 
claims the benefit of the status. 16 Here it is clear that the bills, the certified cheques, 
were affected with fraud or other illegality. The presumption that their holder, 
[the plaintiftl, was a holder in due course falls away, The onus of proving that he 
is a holder in due course shifts to Esses. BMO does not have to prove the 
opposite ... 17 
4. DISCUSSION: THE LAW 
Underlying his judgment are thus the assumptions that (i) a payee 
may benefit from the holder in due course presumption under BEA s. 
57(2), and that (ii) a payee may be a holder in due course. In fact, doctrine 
is hostile to both assumptions. 
As the former, Talbot v. Von Boris, 18 a leading English case, decided 
that the corresponding provision to BEA s. 57(2) requires value to be 
given after the issue of the bill. Hence, Talbot v. Von Boris held that the 
provision cannot benefit the payee, to whom the bill was originally 
issued. On its basis, Guest concludes, that 
Where ... the claimant is the original payee of the instrument, the defendant must 
prove that the claimant received the instrument with notice of fraud, etc., with 
14 Ibid., at<para. 33. 
15 Ibid., at para. 67. 
16 The provision reads in full as follows: 
(2) Every holder of a bill is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, deemed to be 
a holder in due course, but if, in an action on a bill, it is admitted or proved that the 
acceptance, issue or subsequent negotiation of the bill is affected with fraud, duress 
or force and fear, or illegality, the burden of proof that he is the holder in due course 
is on him, unless and until he proves that, subsequent to the alleged fraud or illegality, 
value has in good faith been given for the bill by some other holder in due course. 
The "unless and until" clause does not appear in the English corresponding provision. 
17 Esses v. Friedberg, supra, n. I at para. 69. See also ibid., at paras. 55-57. 
1• [ 1911] I K.B. 854 (Eng. C.A.). 
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the curious result that in the matter of proof the original payee is in a more 
favoured position that a person to whom the instrument has been negotiated, since 
the burden does not shift to him to prove that subsequent the fraud, etc., value 
has in good faith been given for the instrument. 19 
Certainly, this is not only "curious" but rather, illogical; accord-
ingly, Crawford rejects Talbot, and concludes that it is "clearly wrong";20 
as he explained earlier, "[t]here can be no doubt that the payee is a 
holder; he is specifically made so by the definition in s. 2 of the BEA. 
Therefore subsection [57(2)] applies in the payee's favour."21 
In my view, the fallacy of Talbot is the assumption that in the 
absence of BEA s. 57(2), a payee is prima facie entitled to recover the 
face-value of the instrument; and yet, under s. 73(a), as a holder he22 is 
accorded a mere right to "sue on the bill in his own name"; that is, he is 
given only the standing to sue on the instrument, so as not to be "liable 
to be defeated ... on the ground that the action has been brought by the 
wrong party";23 he is given neither the entitlement to recover the entire 
amount of the instrument, nor even the benefit of any presumption as to 
such an entitlement. 
Similarly, my position is that a "holder for value" under BEA s. 
53(2) is not helpful to plaintiff's case. This provision states that"[ w ]here 
value has, at any time, been given for a bill, the holder is deemed to be 
a holder for value as regards the acceptor and all parties to the bill who 
became parties prior to that time." In my view, with this provision, the 
holder overcomes only a challenge to his right made on the basis of 
absence of consideration or value, namely, his taking the instrument by 
way of gift;24 "the ... provision means only that absence [of] consider-
ation is not an equity of ownership; that is, the one who acquired an 
19 A.G. Guest, Chalmers and Guest on Bills of Exchange, Cheques and Promissory Notes, 
~ 16th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005) at 299-300 (para. 4-085). 
2° Crawford, supra, n. 7 at 925 (§21 :03.5(d)). 
21 B. Crawford, Crawford and Falconbridge Banking and Bills of Exchange, vol. 2, 8th ed. 
(Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1986) at 1470 (§5102.5(c)). 
22 This Comment follows the language of the BEA which is not gender-neutral. Certainly, 
"he" is to be taken to include "she" or"it", and "himself' is to include "herself' and "itself." 
23 Atlas Lumber Co. v. Winstanley (1940), 1940 Carswel!Alta 59, [1941] S.C.R. 87, [1941] l 
D.L.R. 625 at 636 (S.C.C.), relying on Sutters v. Briggs, [ 1922] I A.C. I at 15 (U.K. H.L.). 
24 Notwithstanding Yan v. Post Office Bank, [1994) I N.Z.L.R. 154 (C.A.), criticized by me 
on that ground in Addendum to article cited supra, n. 4. See ( 1994) 73 Can. Bar Rev. 2 I at 
280. 
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instrument by way of a gift, without giving value, may recover from 
prior parties liable on the instrument, though subject to their defences."25 
Indeed, it is only the holder in due course who, under s. 73(h ), 
"holds the hill free from any defect of title of prior parties, as well as 
from mere personal defences available to prior parties among them-
selves, and [who] may enforce payment against all parties liable on the 
hill" for its entire amount. Thus, I argue, as a matter of the better 
interpretation of the BEA, without the benefit of the presumption under 
s. 57(2), a payee is not to be accorded an entitlement to recover the face 
amount of the instrument without proving this entitlement in the first 
place. 
As for, notwithstanding Talbot and like Crawford, whether s. 57(2) 
applies to the payee, the fundamental question is whether a payee can 
he a holder in due course in the first place. In fact, here lies the second 
doctrinal difficulty bypassed in Esses v. Friedberg. 
Thus, a holder in due course must he "a person to whom after its 
completion by and as between the immediate parties, the bill or note has 
been negotiated."26 Accordingly, the orthodox English position, stated 
in R.E. Jones Ltd. v. Waring & Gillow Ltd.,27 has been that the expression 
"holder in due course" does not include the original payee. The judgment 
has not received a warm reception in Canada, 28 and yet, possibly with a 
few lower courts' exceptions, no decided case endeavoured to challenge 
it doctrinally; the result is lack of actual determination of the issue, and 
hence, an inconclusive state of law on the point.29 
As a matter of the plain language of the BEA, that is straight forward 
statutory interpretation, Jones v. Waring is easily justified. Thus, under 
25 Geva, supra, n. 4 at 281-82 (addendum). Emphasis in the original. For analysis, see B. 
Geva, Financing Consumer Sales and Product Defences in Canada and the United States 
(Toronto, Carswell, 1984) at 150-51, and earlier, B. Geva, "Absence of Consideration in 
the L~w of Bills and Notes" (1980) Cambridge L.J. 360. 
26 Lewis v. Clay (1897), 77 L.T. 653 (Eng. Q.B.) at 656. 
27 [ 1926] All E.R. Rep. 36, [ 1926] A.C. 670 (U.K. H.L.). 
28 Most notably, Falconbridge was of the view that Jones v. Waring "appears to be open to 
criticism, as being based on technical and not wholly convincing reasoning, and as reaching 
a conclusion which is not entirely satisfactory from the practical point of view, because 
there are situations in which the payee should logically be fully protected as a subsequent 
holder." A.W. Rogers, Falconbridge on Banking and Bills of Exchange, 7th ed. (Toronto: 
Canada Law Book, 1969) at 625-26. 
29 For cites and discussion see Crawford, supra, n. 7 at 930-931 (21 :03.7(a)). 
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BEA s. 55( 1 )(b ), "at the time the bill was negotiated to [a holder in due 
course] he [must have] had no notice of any defect in the title of the 
person who negotiated it." (Emphasis added). This is taken to mean that 
a holder in due course must take the instrument by negotiation; under 
BEA s. 59(3), "A bill payable to order is negotiated by the endorsement 
of the holder." (Emphasis added). By definition, a payee of an instrument 
does not receive it by "the endorsement of the holder"; rather, typically, 
the instrument is "issued" to him; stated otherwise, per definition of 
"issue" in BEA s. 2, he receives the instrument under "the first delivery 
of [it], complete in form", to himself as its first holder.30 
This interpretation, is not a mere technicality; rather, the taking by 
negotiation requirement for a holder in due course reflects the fact that 
as a purchaser of the instrument he has a derivative title thereto; as such 
he is a remote party to the original dealing that gave rise to the instrument, 
and thus can be immune from any defence or claim arising therefrom. 
In contrast, the payee is typically an immediate party to such dealings, 
and thus should not be insulated from defences or claims arising there-
from. Thus, when buyer issues to a seller an instrument in payment for 
goods, the seller, as a payee is an immediate party, will not qualify as a 
holder in due course. However, a financial institution, to which the seller 
negotiates the instrument, may nevertheless become a holder in due 
course, subject of course to compliance with all other statutory require-
ments.31 
However, elsewhere, I pointed out that a payee of a banker instru-
ment on which a bank is obligated, that is, a bank draft, money order or 
certified cheque, is usually its purchaser from the remitter. The latter is 
the originator of the instrument, who paid value to the obligated banker 
for its issue or certification. 32 Accordingly, I argued that, 33 
notwithstanding what appears to be clear statutory language to the contrary, the 
payee of a banker instrument may be treated ... as one who has taken the 
30 Under BEA, s. 2, "issue" means "the first delivery of a bill or note, complete in form, to a 
person who takes it as a holder." 
31 Statutory requirements are set out in BEA, s. 55(1) reproduced, supra, n. 8. 
32 This is obvious in the case of a bank draft, money order, or a cheque whose certification 
was procured by the drawer. However, to that end, certification procured by the holder 
"must be regarded as the issuance of a new ... instrument with the drawer being regarded 
as the remitter, notwithstanding the genesis of the instrument as an ordinary cheque." Geva, 
supra, n. 4 at 38. 
33 Geva, supra, n. 4, at 30-31. 
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instrument by negotiation. Underlying this interpretation of the [BEA] is the 
proposition that unlike a usual payee, the payee of a banker's instrument is a 
remote party vis-a-vis the issuer. Such a payee has a derivative title to the instru-
ment conferred upon him by the paying party. Indeed, the rights to and on the 
instrument of the remitter, namely, someone who procures or purchases from the 
issuer an instrument payable to another who has not transferred the instrument 
yet, go back to the law merchant and early English law. Not being a holder, the 
remitter is best viewed as the first owner of the instrument. The paying party 
procuring the banker's instrument payable to his creditor is such a remitter, having 
the power to recover on the instrument as well as to transfer it, particularly to the 
payee .... It is in this sense that the payee of a banker's instrument procured by 
a remitter is a remote party, vis-a-vis its issuer, with a derivative title to the 
instrument, conferred to him by the paying party/remitter. 
As a matter of statutory interpretation, I relied on BEA s. 59(1 ), 
providing for the broad definition for "negotiation" as a transfer of a bill 
of exchange "from one person to another in such a manner as to constitute 
the transferee the holder of the bill." This definition does not require the 
transferor to be a holder; rather, he could be a remitter, as a non-holder 
owner, transferring the instrument to the payee. Indeed, the requirement 
that for "negotiation" to happen, the transferor of a bill must be a holder 
appears in BEA s. 59(3), under which "A bill payable to order is nego-
tiated by the endorsement of the holder." And while it is natural to 
interpret BEA s. 59(3) and s. 59(2), providing that "A bill payable to 
bearer is negotiated by delivery," as exhausting the categories of "ne-
gotiation" as set out in s. 59(1 ), this is not the only plausible interpre-
tation. Thus, it is possible to read s. 59(1) as providing for a broad 
principle, for which the most common examples are given in s. 59(2) 
and (3), without reading these subsections as necessarily exhaust all 
possibilities of "negotiation" under s. 59(1). Stated otherwise, a case 
falling under neither s. 59(2) nor s. 59(3), such as the transfer of a bill 
payable to order by its remitter, may nevertheless be "negotiation" under 
s. 59(1). 
Accordingly, a payee who acquires a bill from the remitter by 
negotiation qualifies to become a holder in due course, provided of 
course all other requirements are met. 34 Indeed, in such a case, there is 
no obstacle in applying BEA s. 57(2) holder-in-due-course presumption 
to that payee. 
34 As set out in BEA, s. 55( I), reproduced in supra, n. 8. 
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5. DISCUSSION: APPLICATION TO THE FACTS OF THE 
CASE 
In Esses v. Friedberg, plaintiff-payee Esses alleged that he had 
acquired the cheques, drawn by drawer-Friedberg and certified by de-
fendant-BMO, from the money dealer, acting as a remitter, in return to 
payment in cash. According to the preceding analysis, this allowed Esses 
to argue receipt by negotiation, and thus rely on the holder in due 
presumption under BEA s. 57(2); except that at this point, per the same 
BEA s. 57(2), he became vulnerable to the rebuttal of that presumption. 
At the same time, BMO argued that the plaintiff was well aware of and 
complicit in the scheme, and further questioned whether plaintiff even 
gave value, in the form of cash or otherwise, for the three Friedberg 
certified cheques. 
For the money dealer to become the remitter of the Friedberg 
cheques he must have acquired at some point the CIBC bank draft, with 
which he bought these cheques. Alternatively, having paid for them with 
the bank draft, it is the fraudster who bought the certified cheques 
through the money dealer; the latter must then be taken to act throughout 
the entire transaction as an agent for the fraudster. In this latter case, it 
is the fraudster, and not the money dealer, who is to be treated as the 
remitter of the certified cheques. The report does not contain nay infor-
mation shedding light on this aspect of the transaction. However, either 
way, the theory of plaintiff Esses must be taken to rely on his alleged 
good faith purchase of the Friedberg certified cheques; that is, his claim 
must be taken to be premised on the theory that he took the certified 
cheques in good faith, by negotiation and for value, from the remitter, 
whether the money dealer acting in his own name, or the fraudster acting 
through the money dealer. It is at this point that once it was determined 
that "the certified cheques, were affected with fraud or other illegality"35 
the onus of proof shifted to Esses. 
I should however state that the fraud or illegality affecting the 
"'certified cheques requires further analysis. Thus, Friedberg acquired the 
CIBC bank draft from its remitter, the fraudster, acting through the 
money dealer. The consideration CIBC received from the fraudster for 
the CIBC bank draft was in the form of proceeds derived from fraud; 
and yet, on the basis of the preceding analysis, Friedberg appears to 
35 Esses v. Friedberg, supra, n. I at para. 69, quoted at text at supra, n. 17. 
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obtain the bank draft by negotiation (from the fraudster through the 
money dealer), for value, and in good faith. As such Friedberg appears 
to have been a holder in due course of the draft. The fraud or illegality 
affecting the certified cheques must then be taken to be premised on the 
fraudulent and illegal source of the consideration for them, 36 which 
nevertheless cannot be asserted against Friedberg. The defence raised 
by BMO is thus based on the adverse claim to the certified cheques of 
the fraud victim.37 
6. DISCUSSION: BEAS. 57 AND PAYEE NOT HOLDER IN 
DUE COURSE 
Certainly, side by side with the endorsee in possession and the 
bearer, the payee in possession is a holder as defined in BEA s. 2. Hence, 
it is superficially appealing to interpret BEA s. 57(2), presuming a holder 
to be a holder in due course, to cover the payee and not only the endorsee 
or the bearer.38 At the same time, other than in the less usual case where 
he takes the instrument by negotiation, the payee, as an original party to 
the instrument, will not qualify as a holder in due course. For such a 
payee the benefit accorded by the presumption under s. 57(2) may easily 
become a blessing in disguise. This is so because the presumption is 
stated to be rebutted when "it is admitted or proved that the acceptance, 
issue or subsequent negotiation of the bill is affected with fraud, duress 
or force and fear, or illegality"; in such a case the burden of proof reverts 
back to the holder. Under BEA s. 57(2),39 it is for the holder to prove 
then that he is either a holder in due course or that he derives title through 
a holder in due course situated in the chain of title between the disqual-
ifying element and himself.40 
36 Indeed, in the facts of the case, "BMO has filed sufficient proof that the cheques Esses 
seeks to have honoured represent the bulk of the fraudulently -obtained mortgage funds" 
Esses v. Friedberg, supra, n. I at para. 64. 
" The ultimate fraud victim could be either BMO or the owner of the residential property. If 
the latter, BMO effectively raised a third-party (jus tertii)' s adverse claim of ownership 
which is available to a party sued by one not holder in due course. See e.g., Lloyd v. Howard 
(1850), 15 Q.B. 995, 117 E.R. 735; and Geva, supra, n. 4 at 47-55. 
'"As in fact held by the Court in Esses v. Friedberg, supra, n. 1 at para. 67, quoted in text 
that follows supra, n. 15. 
39 Reproduced in full, supra, n. 16. 
40 Indeed, according to BEA, s. 56, "A holder, whether for value or not, who derives his title 
to a bill through a holder in due course, and who is not himself a party to any fraud or 
illegality affecting it, has all the rights of that holder in due course as regards the acceptor 
and all parties to the bill prior to that holder." 
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However, in the usual case, a payee to whom the instrument was 
issued rather than "negotiated," will not be able to prove holding in due 
course as required under BEA s. 57(2). From this perspective, it appears 
only fair to construe BEA s. 57(2) as inapplicable to the payee; there is 
no point to confer the benefit of the presumption on one who is unable 
to repel its rebuttal. However, with this interpretation we are left with 
no guidance as to the position of a maker or drawer vis-a-vis a payee in 
the case of proven or admitted third party's fraud, duress, or illegality, 
alleged but not proven to be known or participated by the payee. 
It is against this background that Talbot v. Von Boris held that in 
the absence of proof as to his own involvement in or knowledge of the 
fraud or duress a payee may enforce full payment against the party 
alleging third-party's fraud or duress, so as effectively to be in a better 
position than that of a holder in due course. The latter would have to 
prove his good faith in relation to the alleged fraud or illegality. 
In fact, a similar result, albeit in reliance on neither BEA s. 57(2) 
nor on Talbot v. Von Boris, may have been reached by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Mollot v. Monette. In that case, a payee obtained 
judgment against a co-maker of a promissory note, possibly notwith-
standing proof of the other co-maker's fraud and allegation of payee's 
compiicity.41 
This state of law is however an absurdity;42 hence courts cannot be 
blamed for trying to "force" the payee into BEA s. 57(2). However, the 
payee is usually an immediate party to the drawer or maker; it is only in 
exceptional circumstances that the payee is a remote party to the drawer 
or maker, who took the instrument by negotiation. Moreover, as I men-
tioned, there is no point in "forcing" the payee into BEA s. 57(2) only 
to find out that in the usual case, in the absence of negotiation, the payee 
is unable to repel the attack on the presumption stated in the provision. 
-...It is thus unreasonable to accord to the payee the benefit of a holding in 
41 1981CarswellQue30, 1981CarswellQue91, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 133, 16 B.L.R. 139, 39 N.R. 
451, 128 D.L.R. (3d) 577 (S.C.C.). Rather, the Supreme Court cited BEA, s. 54(2) providing 
that "An accommodation party is liable on a bill to a holder for value, and it is immaterial 
whether, when that holder took the bill, he knew that party to be an accommodation party 
or not." In my view, this provision provides for the statutory contract of an accommodation 
party, on the same footing as for example BEA, s. 129(a) provides for the drawer's statutory 
contract, and thus ought not to be read as fastening defence-free absolute liability. 
42 See text around supra, n. 19. 
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due course presumption that fits a remote party who takes the instrument 
by negotiation. 
The solution to this dilemma is to identify the real issue not as 
whether a payee ought to enjoy the presumption under BEA s. 57(2); 
rather, the more pressing issue, is whether once "forced" into the pro-
vision, the payee ought not to be given the opportunity to repel the attack 
on the presumption, on the same footing as the endorsee. Stated other-
wise, the payee is to be brought into BEA s. 57(2) only in order to allow 
him a reasonable exit from the attack on its presumption. Stated other-
wise, even the payee who in the unusual case takes the instrument by 
negotiation ought not to be better off than the payee who in the usual 
case does not take the instrument by negotiation. 
A scenario to that point involves an action by a payee who did not 
take the instrument by "negotiation," and against whom the defendant, 
drawer or maker, alleges but cannot prove, participation in or knowledge 
of, proven or admitted third-party-fraud or duress. Both Talbot v. Von 
Boris and Mollot v. Monette fall into this pattern. Certainly the defendant 
who in such a situation could have thrown the onus of proof on an 
endorsee, ought not to have been unable to throw the onus of proof on 
the payee, regardless of whether the payee took the instrument by ne-
gotiation. As well, the payee is to be afforded then a way to repel the 
attack which negates to him the benefit of the presumption under s. 
57(2). 
In my view, in the face of the "plain meaning" of BEA s. 57(2) 
which poses difficulties to achieve that result, the most elegant solution 
is to read the provision as not dealing with a holder in due course, but 
rather with the rights of a holder in due course. Indeed, under this 
interpretation, the key to the understanding of BEA s. 57(2) is not to 
focus on the holder n due status per se, but rather on the defence-free 
position associated with that status. Stated otherwise, I propose to read 
the subsection as providing that: 
Every holder of a bill is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, deemed to 
have the rights of 43 a holder in due course, but if, in an action on a bill, it is 
admitted or proved that the acceptance, issue or subsequent negotiation of the bill 
is affected with fraud, duress or force and fear, or illegality, the burden of proof 
43 Instead of "be" in the existing provision. 
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that he has the rights of a44 holder in due course is on him, unless and until he 
proves that, subsequent to the alleged fraud or illegality, value has in good faith 
been given for the bill by another person who has the rights of a holder in due 
course. 
(Substituting language is in bold letters.) 
This interpretation will do the least violence to the language of the 
provision; at the same time, it will overrule both Talbot v. Von Boris 
and Mollot v. Monette and protect the drawer and maker alleging against 
the payee third-party's fraud, duress or illegality, in the same way as 
they would be protected in an action brought by an endorsee. It will also 
give the payee a way to meet the negation of the presumption by proving 
his own compliance with the good faith and value requirements so as to 
be entitled to recover the full amount of the instrument, and thereby 
have the rights of a holder in due course. 
7. CONCLUSION 
In any event, in the final analysis, as indicated, Esses v. Friedberg 
involved "negotiation" to the payee, at least under the better interpre-
tation of BEA s. 59(1). Strictly speaking then, it was not necessary to 
go that far in the interpretation of BEA s. 57(2) as just suggested above. 
At the same time, it is unfortunate that the Court glossed over difficult 
issues associated with the application of s. 57(2) to the payee as well as 
with the payee's position as a holder in due course. A thorough discus-
sion of these issues would have given a stronger credence to the judgment 
as well as settle important fundamentals in the law of bills and notes. 
However, this drawback, lamentable as it is, does not diminish from the 
original observation made by the Court; thus, in declining to see liability 
under certification/acceptance as absolute and necessarily defence-free, 
the case is a positive development in Canadian law of negotiable instru-
ments. 
44 Instead of "is the" in the existing provision. 
